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What’s new in déjà vu?
…it was even possible that none of what he thought had taken place, really had 
taken place, that he was dealing with an aberration of memory rather than of per-
ception, that he never really had thought he had seen what he now thought he once 
did think he had seen, that his impression now that he once had thought so was 
merely the illusion of an illusion, and that he was only now imagining that he had 
ever once imagined seeing a naked man sitting in a tree at the cemetery.
Joseph Heller, Catch 22
This essay outlines current research on the experience of déjà vu. After 
introducing déjà vu and presenting data on its incidence and character, 
two categories of explanations are discussed and evaluated. The first 
group of explanations posits that déjà vu arises from a similarity be-
tween the current and some previous situation. The second group posits 
that the experience results from aberrant neural processes and thus is 
not related to our current environment in any way. Next we look at what 
are perceived as two key areas of future research. A crucial question is 
whether there is only one type of déjà vu or whether there are several, 
with different causes and different characteristics. The answer to this 
question informs whether or not we can reconcile competing theories 
of déjà vu. Finally, we discuss the methodological difficulties faced by 
those studying déjà vu and the steps that we must take to improve cur-
rent methodologies.
Introducing déjà vu
Déjà vu is an experience of familiarity combined with the awareness 
that this experience is inappropriate. According to a review by Brown 
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(2004), questionnaire data shows that déjà vu occurs in the daily lives of 
67% of the population. Its occurrence is typically once every couple of 
months and it occurs most frequently in young people. Many research-
ers have linked the experience to being stressed or tired. It can happen 
in new situations but is also often observed in mundane situations such 
as when relaxing, commuting or when in familiar, everyday environ-
ments such as at school or at work. Déjà vu then, is an infrequent and 
perplexing experience, more common in younger adults, and one which 
should be particularly pertinent for psychology students.
Those who have had it recently will remember that it is not merely 
that we experience the feeling of having encountered a single specif-
ic object before; rather, we feel as if we have been in this particular 
place, looking at this particular object, in this particular way before. It 
is a truly all-encompassing subjective experience as it combines affect, 
thought, perceptions and cognitions (Wild, 2005). For the psychology 
student, and even the memory expert, it can be a confusing, paradoxical 
sensation, as is encapsulated in Joseph Heller’s quote that prefaced this 
chapter.
Déjà vu is fascinating for researchers to study because of what it 
tells us about the functioning of memory (e.g. O’Connor, Moulin & 
Cohen, 2008). In déjà vu one observes a dissociation or clash between 
the current mnemonic experience and one’s assessment of it; it is the 
experience of familiarity combined with awareness that this feeling is 
wrong. As such, while déjà vu is often described as an instance where 
memory has somehow failed or tricked us, it can equally be described 
as an instance where the cognitive processes that allow us to monitor 
our memory are extremely successful. Déjà vu is evidence that two sys-
tems are at play in memory – something which relays contents of prior 
episodes to mind, and something which reflects on what is brought to 
mind (e.g Koriat, 2000). In déjà vu, the latter system allows us to cor-
rectly reject an experience of familiarity as inappropriate. As such, déjà 
vu has been described as ‘metacognitive’ and as evidence that there are 
memory ‘feelings’ which operate in human cognition (see Moulin & 
Souchay, in press).
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Theoretical explanations of déjà vu
Theories of déjà vu can be divided into two categories, bottom-up and 
top-down theories. Bottom-up theories assume that the experience is 
data-driven; elicited by something in the environment that triggers this 
subjective, internal response. On the other hand, top-down theories as-
sume that déjà vu is triggered by aberrant neural processes that sit above 
our perceptions of the environment, exerting their influence on whatev-
er we happen to perceive at the time.
Bottom-up theories of déjà vu
While there are many theoretical explanations of déjà vu (Brown, 2004), 
currently a key line of research focuses on the similarity hypothesis – 
the idea that the situation eliciting the déjà vu is in some way similar to 
a prior experience. For example, Cleary, Ryals and Nomi (2009) used 
the recognition-without-cued-recall (RWCR) paradigm to study déjà 
vu. In this paradigm, participants first study pictures of internal and 
external scenes, such as pictures of a room or a street, and later are 
presented with new scenes some of which are similar to the pictures 
they studied. The similarity between scenes is created by positioning 
different features of a scene in a common configuration, so that the fea-
tures across different pictures are perceptually comparable in how they 
relate to each other. An example in daily life might be driving down a 
country road for the first time and seeing a church by a fountain on the 
left. You may not have seen that church and that fountain before, but 
you may have been somewhere before with a similar configuration of a 
building with a spire and fountain. In Cleary’s experiments, participants 
were asked to indicate whether a presented new scene was similar in its 
configuration to one of the studied scenes, rate its familiarity and recall 
the studied scene. On the occasions when participants indicated a scene 
was similar and yet were unable to recall the original, they were asked 
whether they had experienced déjà vu. In these instances participants 
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reported déjà vu significantly more often when they identified a similar 
new scene as familiar (17%) compared to when they identified an unre-
lated new scene as familiar (13%). We will return to the small difference 
between reports of déjà vu across conditions later. For now, it should be 
noted that the strength of this approach is that it allows the researchers 
to capture and isolate instances where subjective awareness of familiar-
ity occurs in the absence of recall – something which undoubtedly does 
occur when déjà vu is experienced.
The previously described approach has been extended by Cleary 
et al. (2012) to virtual reality 3D environments. Once again, the config-
ural similarity of objects was compared, this time across a number of 
virtual ‘rooms’. In this virtual reality experiment, Cleary et al. assessed 
the experience of familiarity but also the experience of newness. They 
asked participants to rate familiarity of scenes that they said were new 
(not part of a configural pair) and whether they experienced déjà vu 
whilst viewing them. This is different to the above paradigm where 
familiarity and déjà vu were assessed for scenes that were said to be 
similar rather than new. They further extended the paradigm by also 
including actually studied scenes in the recognition phase. They found 
that the probability of déjà vu being reported was highest for old scenes 
incorrectly identified as new (51%), followed by configurally similar 
scenes correctly identified as new (33%) and new scenes identified as 
new (18%). Crucially, familiarity ratings followed the same pattern. 
This correspondence between déjà vu reports and familiarity ratings 
is consistent with bottom-up theories of déjà vu. The conclusion from 
those involved in this line of empirical work is that déjà vu results from 
situations similar to previous experiences. This creates a feeling of fa-
miliarity which can nevertheless sit alongside an explicit assessment 
of novelty, creating a clash between the subjective experience and the 
objective evaluation of the situation.
On the face of it, these studies are the closest scientists have come 
in over 100 years of research to producing déjà vu in the lab and there-
fore understanding its formation. However, as OૅConnor and Moulin 
(2010) pointed out, the researchers have to explain how this RWCR 
is different from a simple experience of familiarity without recollec-
tion, something which happens often in daily life and which doesn’t 
cause déjà vu. Memory researchers typically recall Mandler’s (1980) 
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description of the butcher on the bus to illustrate a strong sensation of 
familiarity (“I know that person on the bus from somewhere”) in the 
absence of recollection (“but I don’t know who it is”). This experience 
can be a result of mismatched context (recollection failed because the 
butcher weૅre used to seeing in the supermarket was seen on the bus). It 
is troubling that the RWCR paradigm doesnૅt offer a way to distinguish 
between experiences of familiarity without recollection and déjà vu, 
rather it seems to assume they are the same which still leaves us with 
the question of what specifically triggers déjà vu.
Top-down theories of déjà vu
The alternative view of déjà vu formation emphasises top-down neu-
ral processes. The starting point for this research was the observation 
that déjà vu is often a symptom experienced as part of the pre-seizure 
aura in temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE). OૅConnor and Moulin (2008) 
reported a case of a TLE patient who experiences déjà vu that does not 
subside even as he changes his perceptual focus by diverting his gaze 
numerous times over the course of his experience. If déjà vu was trig-
gered by what he was looking at as bottom-up theories suggest, it would 
seem changing the input, such as by looking at something else, should 
end the experience. It is from this line of research that the top-down 
approach to déjà vu has emerged.
The perspective of top-down theories on déjà vu is that it is a “ran-
dom mental event” (Illman, Butler, Souchay and Moulin, 2012, p. 8). 
That is to say, déjà vu is a result of aberrant neural activation which 
is not driven by oneૅs immediate environment. Memory processes are 
thought to rely mainly on temporal lobe structures with distinct regions 
mapping onto unique processes. More specifically, Aggleton and Brown 
(1999) suggested the experience of familiarity is based on processing in 
the parahippocampal cortex as opposed to remembering which is reliant 
on the hippocampus (see Fig. 1). Spatt (2002) proposed déjà vu might 
be linked to incorrect activations in the regions responsible for famil-
iarity. Illman et al. described their theory as the ‘decoupled familiarity 
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hypothesis’: déjà vu is thought to be an instance of the incorrect acti-
vation of the experience of familiarity decoupled from the otherwise 
correct processing of oneૅs environment that informs one everything is 
in fact new and so ought not be familiar.
Figure 1: Coronal Section of the Temporal Lobe showing key structures.
Research focused on identifying the specific structures related to déjà vu 
has often used epileptic patients. As part of routine care and treatment, 
and part of the work-up for brain surgery, epileptic patients sometimes 
have electrical current applied directly to their brains. The resulting 
activations, experiences and behaviours are critical for mapping brain 
structures which should be spared in surgery targeting epileptic foci 
(e.g. those involved in language processing). The effects that result from 
these stimulations are of great value for understanding the brain.
Using such brain techniques, Bartolomei et al. (2004) conclud-
ed that déjà vu was most reliably elicited by stimulation of subhippo-
campal familiarity areas rather than other areas important for memory. 
More specifically, and consistent with Spatt’s hypothesis, they found 
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stimulation of a tiny region called the entorhinal cortex to be a more re-
liable elicitor of déjà vu than the amygdala or the hippocampus. How-
ever, not only do different methods of stimulations in different areas 
lead to different results but stimulations of the same areas on different 
days lead to different results, and this story is a long way from com-
plete. For instance, Kovacs et al. (2009) found that déjà vu could be 
elicited by stimulation of another region (the globus pallidus). On the 
other hand, they also observed that the instances where this stimulation 
did produce déjà vu there was hyperperfusion or increased blood flow 
in the temporal lobe suggesting a discharge into and involvement of 
this area. Further, Bowles et al. (2007) reported a case of a TLE patient 
who following surgery to the temporal lobe ceased experiencing déjà 
vu with the other product of the intervention being impaired famil-
iarity and preserved recollection. This then lends support to the view 
that déjà vu is related to familiarity processing and associated brain 
regions.
Brazdil et al. (2012) have taken the important step of expanding 
this work beyond the TLE literature by looking at structural differences 
in the healthy population between people that experience déjà vu and 
those that do not. They observed differences in grey matter volume be-
tween these groups, and again, it is the temporal lobe which is implicat-
ed. Those experiencing déjà vu were found to have less grey matter in 
this area, and the volume was inversely related to the number of report-
ed déjà vu experiences.
That said, Bartolomei et al. (2012) suggested that rather than look-
ing at specific structures, one should, given the current move towards 
understanding brain activity in terms of complex, interconnected net-
works (e.g. Fox et al., 2005), consider how the regions work togeth-
er. Their research suggests “déjà vu is related to increased correlation 
among MTL [medial temporal lobe] structures rather than being a ‘lo-
cal’ phenomenon” (p. 494). Illman et al. (2012) agree that given the 
complexity and uniqueness of déjà vu, it seems unlikely it can be traced 
to a single structure. As mentioned, this is in line with current research 
which suggests cognitive processes have to be understood in the context 
of a pattern of activations rather than in the context of isolated regions 
of activity (McIntosh, 2000).
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In sum, the next step on the path to understanding the neural pro-
cesses underlying déjà vu will be to look closer at brain networks. For 
now, however, the evidence suggests that at the very least, déjà vu in 
TLE can be linked to neural processes in the temporal lobe and there 
is some indication emerging that this might also be true for the healthy 
brain and seizure unrelated experiences of déjà vu.
Different types of déjà vu?
One of the questions facing déjà vu research at the moment is whether 
there is only one type of déjà vu experienced both as a symptom of 
certain disorders such as TLE and part of normal, every-day life. One 
could view the two experiences as distinct, meaning that findings from 
TLE studies are not relevant to bottom-up theories of every-day oc-
currences of déjà vu. In support of this argument, Adachi et al. (2010) 
showed that TLE patients can distinguish between déjà vu experienced 
as part of the pre-seizure aura and déjà vu experienced as part of their 
daily life. However, it is worth noting that the difference might also be 
due to the fact that déjà vu related to seizure activity is not an isolated 
event. It is likely to be accompanied by other experiences not present in 
‘healthy’ déjà vu, such as headaches, nausea or emotional responses, all 
part of epileptic activity, making it distinct.
In support of this interpretation, Warren-Gash & Zeman (2014) 
used a questionnaire to assess déjà vu in TLE and controls (with and 
without neurological complaint). They found that the TLE experience 
was similar to the healthy experience, and it could only be differentiated 
by the ‘company it keeps’, i.e. the other phenomena part of TLE seizure 
activity. Furthermore, Brazdil et al., (2012) found structural differences 
in the healthy population between people who experience déjà vu and 
those that do not. This suggests a unified source of déjà vu experiences 
across patient and non-patient groups and provides an important first 
link between déjà vu in TLE and déjà vu experienced as part of daily 
life. Indeed the authors suggest there is at least an overlap in the physi-
ology of these two déjà vu experiences. In sum, several research teams 
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point to a continuity between healthy and epileptic forms of déjà vu. 
While it is too soon to say there isn’t a bottom-up form of déjà vu or 
a combination of factors in the production of this strange experience, 
work such as Brazdil et al.’s is moving us toward a unified conceptual-
ization of déjà vu.
Methodological issues in déjà vu research
The greatest obstacle to déjà vu research and what has prevented re-
searchers from delving into this topic more comprehensively is the nec-
essary reliance on subjective self-reports. Unlike traditional memory 
impairments where researchers can objectively assess memory perfor-
mance, the experience of déjà vu is entirely subjective. This means the 
only way to assess whether the experience has been replicated in the 
lab is to ask participants a question like “Have you experienced déjà 
vu?”. This is the method Cleary et al. (2009) used to assess déjà vu oc-
currence following presentation of experimental materials which they 
hypothesized would trigger déjà vu and following presentation of con-
trol materials which should not. As O’Connor and Moulin (2010) noted, 
while the probability of reporting déjà vu was 17% for the experimental 
items, it was as high as 13% in the control condition – where we would 
not expect déjà vu. While this difference was statistically significant, the 
difference is also surprisingly small. Firstly, the researchers struggle to 
explain why participants would report experiencing déjà vu in the con-
trol condition at all, as it is not consistent with their explanation of déjà 
vu as familiarity evoked by similarity. Secondly, given that déjà vu is 
reported to only occur once in a couple of months in daily life (Brown, 
2004), the 13% and 17% seems really high for a laboratory estimate. 
There are two possible explanations here. First, it might be that the lab-
oratory and real life déjà vu are similar but differ in intensity or com-
pleteness – that is, there may be a mild or incomplete laboratory form 
of déjà vu which is easily produced. This is something which needs 
further research. Second, O’Connor and Moulin (2010) suggested it 
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might rather be the case that the way the experiment was set up created 
demand characteristics.
Orne (1962) introduced the idea of demand characteristics, concep-
tualized as cues in the experiment that convey the experimental hypoth-
esis to the participant without the experimenter intending them to. He 
pointed out participants’ motivation to behave as they perceive the ex-
perimenter wants them to, so as to aid the experiment by producing the 
expected result. Research has shown participants tailor their responses 
to what they perceive to be the expectations of the experimenter in an at-
tempt to be relevant (Norenzayan and Schwarz, 1999). What this means 
in context of déjà vu research is that when participants are asked repeat-
edly about experiencing déjà vu, they might simply assume they ought 
to be experiencing it and they might even want to respond affirmatively 
so as to give what they suspect is the expected result. This is clearly 
troubling for déjà vu research and emphasises the necessity for bet-
ter measurement tools. O’Connor and Moulin (2010) stressed that déjà 
vu should be clearly defined and space should be given to participants 
to give descriptive accounts of their experience along with the chance 
for them to spontaneously report experiencing déjà vu. Only after such 
measures should researchers start asking specific yes/no type questions 
about the participants’ experiences during the experiment, what is of-
ten referred to as ‘funnel’ debriefing. As is the case with the know/
remember distinction (Gardiner and Java, 1993), many studies explain 
the difference carefully before asking participants to make judgments 
on which one they experienced (e.g. Rajaram, 1993). A similar kind of 
dialogue between participants and experimenters should be established 
in the study of déjà vu. Part of this might be asking participants to bring 
to mind specific instances of their previous déjà vu experiences to make 
them fully appreciate the nature of the experience before they are asked 
whether they have experienced it during an experiment. As such, the 
next important step for further déjà vu research is to establish better 
methodologies that allow the study of the experience whilst simultane-
ously eliminating (or at least minimizing) demand characteristics.
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Conclusion
We have seen that déjà vu can be researched in the laboratory using 
memory experiments and questionnaires in healthy groups of people 
as well as people with neurological disorders. The different approaches 
and populations studied give rise to different theories and results, and 
we gave an overview of two competing ideas – bottom up and top down 
theories of déjà vu formation. In fact, the extent to which these theories 
might compete is not clear. Despite the massive progress we have made 
in the last ten years, it seems that we are still in the early days of under-
standing déjà vu.
To follow from here, there are two main points to consider. First, 
we should not confuse déjà vu with other similar mental experiences 
such as familiarity without recollection. Rather the focus should be on 
understanding how déjà vu differs from, or indeed incorporates, these 
related, more prevalent phenomena as a way of gaining better under-
standing of it. Second, we must recognize that déjà vu research is sus-
ceptible to demand characteristics and that this needs to be carefully 
controlled for to increase confidence in and usefulness of our data. 
Reaching a common consensus on means of experimentally generating 
déjà vu and exerting better control over our experimental paradigms 
opens up the opportunity to start bridging the gaps in our understanding 
of this nebulous, fascinating experience.
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